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Abstract 
The starting point for this paper is a critical discussion of claims of 
psychological reality articulated within Borg’s (forth.) minimal seman-
tics and Carpintero’s (2007) character*-semantics. It has been proposed, 
for independent reasons, that their respective accounts can accommodate, 
or at least avoid the challenge from psychological evidence. I outline 
their respective motivations, suggesting various shortcomings in their 
efforts of preserving the virtues of an uncontaminated semantics in the 
face of psychological objection (I-II), and try to make the case that, at 
least for a theory of utterance comprehension, a truth-conditional prag-
matic stance is far preferable. An alternative from a relevance-theoretic 
perspective is offered in terms of mutual adjustment between truth-
conditional content and implicature(s), arguing that many “free” prag-
matic processes are needed to uncover the truth-conditional content, 
which can then warrant the expected implicature(s) (III). I finally il-
lustrate the difficulties their accounts have in predicting the correct order 
of interpretation in cases of ironic metaphor, i.e. metaphor is computed 
first, as part of truth-conditional content, while irony is inferentially 
grounded in metaphorical content (IV).
Keywords: psychological reality, minimal semantics, character*-semantics, 
truth-conditional pragmatics, metaphor, ironic metaphor.
I. How Does Semantics Relate To Psychology?
Borg’s semantic project aims at substantiating the claim that semantic facts 
depend on psychological facts. This can be established from two different per-
spectives: metaphysical (i.e. concerning what determines (or fixes) what the 
speaker means) and epistemic (i.e. concerning what is used by interpreters to 
identify what the speaker means). Thus, by expressing her allegiance to the 
Gricean project, Borg signs up for metaphysical dependence, although not in 
Grice’s (1989) sense of explaining semantic content in terms of intentional 
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content, but rather in terms of a psychological module responsible for our lin-
guistic/semantic competence (i.e. knowledge that underpins our understanding 
of linguistic meaning). From this perspective, facts about semantic content, like 
words/sentences meaning, ought to be determined via their relation to the men-
tal states speakers express by uttering them. But the conditions for epistemic 
dependence, according to which “the route to a correct semantic theory runs 
via an account of the [mental] contents of language-users,” don’t seem easily 
met by Grice’s or Borg’s account. E.g. Grice’s assumption that in understanding 
an utterance the literal sentence meaning is prior to speaker meaning is not 
psychologically confirmed. The same challenge seems to apply to Borg’s ac-
count, insofar as she takes the minimal content to be prior to, and independent 
of, speaker meaning. So her attempt of using psychological facts about linguis-
tic competence in semantic theorizing is vulnerable, until a way out for con-
forming to psychological evidence is articulated. This challenge is taken up in 
Borg’s (forth.), but before assessing the success of her enterprise, a few words 
about the foundations of her “Minimal Semantics.” 
Borg’s semantic minimalism rests on three main claims. (i) There are 
“minimal contents (propositions/truth-conditions)” that are “maximally free 
from contextual effects and provide the literal meanings of sentences;” (ii) 
Minimal contents are not speech-act content, i.e. what is communicated by a 
speaker who utters those sentences; (iii) Semantic content is delivered by a 
modular/computational language faculty. This conception of semantic content 
entails that there can be no appeal to the intentional states of current speakers 
at the semantic level. In so doing, it assumes that all (declarative) sentences have 
semantically determined truth-conditions that are context-dependent when, but 
only when, obvious context-sensitive elements like demonstratives and indexi-
cals are present. Borg’s motivation is, clearly, to provide an explanation of se-
mantic content as being permeable to contextual features in highly constrained 
ways, by using only well-established syntactic and semantic machinery based 
on standard linguistic assumptions.1 
1 Minimalists, like indexicalists (Stanley 2000), hold that all pragmatic processes involved 
in the determination of an utterance’s truth-conditions are linguistically driven and controlled 
by the conventional meaning of words. They amount to saturation—i.e. the provision of con-
textual values for indexicals, morphemes of tenses, genitives and the like—conceived not as a 
purely contextual process but, rather, as being triggered by a linguistic rule. Since the process 
occurs just in case the sentence/expression sets up a slot to be contextually filled in, it is thereby 
mandatory: in every context in which the sentence/expression is uttered, the given contextual 
ingredient has to be provided, and can never be dispensed with. In confining pragmatics to 
saturation in this way, indexicalism and minimalism subordinate pragmatics to linguistic mean-
ing in the determination of truth-conditions: in grasping the truth-conditions of an utterance 
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I have, however, my doubts that the semantic assumptions on which Borg 
rests her minimal semantics can deliver the intuitive truth-conditional content 
of an utterance, i.e. what is communicated as part of the explicit content in 
normal conversational contexts. By delivering a truth-conditional content that 
is minimal (i.e. it excludes all pragmatic/defeasible inferences from semantics), 
her account seems committed to attributing truth-conditions to sentences that 
seem to fall short of having them, suggesting that they express weak existential, 
or “liberal” propositions. E.g. suppose Jack and Jill are in a rush, preparing to 
go to the cinema. Jill has reached the front door, but Jack has just stepped out 
of the shower. They say:
a. Jill: Let’s go 
b. Jack: I’m not ready
Intuitively, Jack speaks truly: he isn’t ready (to leave for the cinema)! 
Minimalists deny this, however: according to Borg, the truth-conditions of (b) 
are that Jack is not ready for something (or other)2—which is false, since, hav-
ing stepped out of the shower he is now ready to start dressing.3 The truth-
conditions posited as part of her minimalist analysis turn out, therefore, to be 
very different from the truth-conditions normal interpreters would ascribe to 
the utterance, and take the speaker to have intuitively said. The difficulty, apart 
from making wrong predictions about the intuitive truth-conditions, is that such 
minimal contents cannot be, as Borg acknowledges, objects of speech-acts (as-
sertions, questions, commands) falling under speaker’s intentions. This makes 
it difficult to see how her account explains the inferential relations between 
semantic and pragmatic information. 
A different kind of criticism is mounted by Recanati (2004) with his ‘avail-
ability principle’ (i.e. language-users have conscious intuitions about what is 
said, i.e. the intuitive truth-conditions), who aims at showing that the availabil-
hearers need to go beyond the conventions of language, but their so doing is still governed by 
the conventions of language.
2
 Pace Borg, Bach (2006) argues that there is no need to make the case that sentences that 
intuitively seem not to express propositions in fact do so; they are simply incomplete, and their 
semantic contents are sub-propositional “propositional radicals” (what Récanati 2004 calls 
“semantic schemata”). Propositionality of the minimal content is not the real issue, however.
3 However, indexicalists can agree with what the intuitive truth-conditions of (b) are: that 
Jack is not ready to go to the cinema. But having agreed with this, they deny that the pragmatic 
processes that yield them are free, as truth-conditional pragmatics predicts (see III). So, for 
example, Stanley holds that (b) contains an unarticulated constituent: at the level of logical form; 
it is not “ready” that occurs but “ready for …,” i.e. the logical form contains a slot that must be 
filled in contextually.
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ity constraint, if correct, leads one to give up minimalism. Clearly, speakers/
hearers do not consciously entertain minimal contents in conversational ex-
changes, for such contents lack in the informativeness or relevance that would 
make them objects of intentional acts. Hence, they cannot, and should not, be 
equated to the utterance’s truth-conditions. Moreover, they cannot function as 
the right basis for generating implicatures. So one either needs to postulate an 
intermediate, pragmatically enriched content which can inferentially warrant 
the implicature(s) (e.g. Bach’s notion of “impliciture,” or relevance theorists’ 
notion of “explicature”),4 or explain how speaker meaning is derived directly 
from minimal contents, eluding thus a level of intuitive truth-conditions. As far 
as I am aware of, Borg’s account does neither.
A more specific concern for minimalism, as Borg acknowledges, is that 
doesn’t fit psychological evidence. Since psychological facts are important for 
semantic theorizing, given her commitment to the metaphysical dependence, 
her theory faces serious difficulties. In particular, in cases of ellipsis, metaphors, 
and scalar implicatures, which are problematic for Gricean models, speaker 
meaning is grasped without the recovery of a minimal content. More specifi-
cally, non-sentential assertions (e.g. ‘To Bill’ as an answer to the question ‘Who 
did you give the ball?’) by which the speaker communicates a complete propo-
sition at the level of speaker meaning even though she does not produce a 
complete sentence, the grasp of that speaker meaning cannot itself depend on 
a prior grasp of minimal content. In many cases of (conversational) metaphors 
the speaker’s meaning is directly and locally accessed,5 without first retrieving 
a minimal content (the literal sentence meaning), and only upon realizing a 
contextual incompatibility, then retrieve the speaker’s metaphorical meaning. 
Further, if cases of scalar implicature (i.e. when a speaker opts to use a weaker 
or stronger item on a given scale and thereby pragmatically conveys that the 
alternative terms on the scale do not hold, e.g. ‘some A’s are B’s’ convey that 
‘some but not all A’s are B’s’) were calculated by first deriving the minimal 
content, the hearer would need to evaluate what the speaker’s words say against 
some contextually-specified level of informativeness in order to exclude more 
informative alternatives, after having established no other reason for the use of 
the less informative term (e.g. speaker’s ignorance or indifference).
4 For a neo-Gricean motivation of doing so, see Soames (2008) who argues that in under-
standing numerals the Gricean conversational maxims help determine what is asserted by 
narrowing the class of possible enrichments to those that most effectively advance the conver-
sation. Such enriched proposition embodies the speaker’s primary intention to assert, and 
therefore contributes to the utterance’s truth-conditions.
5 See Bezuidenhout (2001), Carston (2002), Recanati (2004), Sperber & Wilson (2007), 
Colston & Gibbs (2002).
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If the empirical evidence for these phenomena is correct, this seems to 
suggest that pragmatic effects can occur at locally (word/phrase-level), as well 
as globally (sentence-level). Yet this runs counter the predictions from minimal-
ism. Borg is confident that this is not a problem for her account, because what 
underpins the semantic competence of language-users, and which explains why 
they are in a position to recover speaker meaning at all, is tacit knowledge of a 
theory of meaning which trades in sentence-contents. My worry with such a 
response is that it merely saves the phenomena, rather than engaging with the 
real processes of speaker meanings retrievals through which interpretation is 
actually arrived at. What Borg takes to compensate the vulnerability of her 
minimalist theory to the psychological challenge does not really engage with 
criteria of theoretical/explanatory adequacy, and hence is not sufficient to grant 
her account the desired epistemic dependence of semantic content on psycho-
logical content.
Her explanation of the minimal content as output of a semantic module 
impervious to any contextual information is dubious if that content is equated 
with the truth-conditions of an utterance, because is many cases there is a gap 
to be bridged between the minimal content and the utterance’s truth-conditional 
content. Even granting that the minimal content delivered by such module is 
only a schematic input that needs to be fleshed out or adjusted so as to function 
as communicated (speaker-meant) content, the question arises as to its psycho-
logical role in comprehension.6 Borg’s attempt to engage with the psychological 
reality issue is commendable, but her claim that there are structures in the brain 
representing the basic elements of minimal theory (semantic rules determining 
sentence meanings from word meanings and syntactic structures), and that the 
deductive processes determining sentence meaning are supposedly mirrored 
by interactions between those structures within our brain, is less palpable as to 
what exactly it amounts to. 
Be that as it may, the question arises as to the consistency between such 
empirical predictions and her minimalist postulates. For example, Borg’s ac-
knowledgment that pragmatic and semantic processes run in parallel, the former 
operating on sub-sentential clauses before the semantic interpretation of the 
sentence is complete, and furthermore, allowing hearers to stop semantic 
processing whenever they have enough evidence to grasp whatever the speaker 
is trying to convey, before the semantic module delivered any sentence-content, 
6 Relevance theorists and Récanati (2004) hold that the minimal content plays no role in 
understanding an utterance, and has no psychological reality. Récanati objects that even when 
we hear a sentence that is semantically incomplete we do not seem to calculate its semantic 
content and entertain a literal minimal content. Rather, we proceed directly to what the speaker 
means.
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seems to me biting the bullet in favour of a truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) 
(see III). What’s more, conceding the idea advocated by relevance theorists of 
a “mutual adjustment” between semantic and pragmatic information, combined 
with the idea of a semantic module seem to make an odd marriage. On any 
characterisation of modularity, the essence of a modular system is that it oper-
ates in accordance with its own dedicated (domain-specific) system of rules 
and/or procedures, and, on the widely accepted Fodorian definition, the language 
system is encapsulated from extralinguistic context, including perceptually 
available information and beliefs about speaker intentions. So there is a real 
predicament for those who recognize that (i) pragmatics is involved not only in 
specifying the correct truth-value (when the utterance expresses a truth-evalu-
able proposition), but also in determining a truth-evaluable proposition that can 
be ascertained as part of speaker meaning (hen the utterance does not express 
one, even after disambiguation and reference assignment have taken place), and 
who at the same time want (ii) to maintain an uncontaminated semantics that 
delivers the utterance’s truth-conditions. One straightforward possibility of 
remedying this difficulty is to argue that, if semantics is bound to deliver truth-
conditions, it needs pragmatics in its rescue, or otherwise to give up to (ii).
My qualms with minimal accounts, such as Borg’s, concern not the task 
of semantics, which I take it to be that of providing an explanatory account of 
the growth of our knowledge of meaning and applying it to indefinitely many 
novel utterances,7 but their disavowing that the relations between semantics and 
semantic competence are independent of language-users’ intentions, and hence 
of pragmatics, which, as we saw, leads to wrong predictions about the intuitive 
truth-conditions of utterances. Some semanticists recognize that many seman-
tic facts require pragmatics to be explained. They either opt for (i) an open-ended 
semantics whose rules of language are materialized in “free variables” at deep 
syntactic structures (indexicalists), thus allowing for flexibility beyond the usual 
building-block combinatorics of a closed compositional system, or (ii) for a 
thin-semantics restricted to encoded linguistic meaning of words/sentences, as 
illustrated by Carpintero (2007a,b) who allows required pragmatic information 
7 The motivation for keeping free (non linguistically-driven) pragmatics away from de-
termining truth-conditions stems from an ambition to provide a systematic explanation of the 
contribution to truth-conditions in terms of precise semantic constraints: only rule-governed/
convention-bound interpretations of terms in accord with those terms’ standing meanings are 
allowed when uncovering the truth-conditions of the utterance. Minimalists’ concern with TCP 
is that context-sensitivity of the kind TCP envisages undermines the possibility of a systematic 
account for meaning, and makes it difficult to explain how, given the finiteness of our cognitive 
resources, we ever come to learn and use a language. We think that such worries are unwar-
ranted, and suggest in III that there are constraints for communicated content, either explicit or 
implicit.
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to contribute at an intermediate level of “what is asserted,” corresponding to 
the utterance’s truth-conditional content.
II. Is Rational Reconstruction Psychologically Real?
Carpintero (2007a) defends a character*-semantics restricted to the con-
ventional meaning or character* of expressions/sentences. Aware that Grice’s 
account is not up to the task in delivering what it promised, namely a level of 
content that is part of speaker meaning, and which is obtained only through 
semantic consideration of the conventional meaning of words, plus their mode 
of combination, Carpintero takes the proper object of semantics to be the con-
ventional meaning of linguistic expressions/sentences, thereby rejecting the 
notion of (truth-conditional) content responsible for the relations holding, in 
virtue of meaning, between linguistic expressions and the world, as being the 
proper object of semantics. Like relevance-theorists and Recanati, he recognises 
that the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances are jointly determined by se-
mantics and pragmatics, which I take to be a safe bet to ensure a neat divide 
between semantic and pragmatics. 
On his view, descendent from the Kaplanian distinction between content 
and character (i.e. a function from contexts of use to content), the character* is 
semantically incomplete, i.e. it consists of a rule assigning a contextual value 
to some expression, but is not its semantic value, and hence, it merely serves to 
constrain the truth-conditional content and help determine it in context. I fully 
agree with Carpintero’s proposal of restricting the semantics to the determina-
tion of sentence-character* corresponding to what is literally said, thus treating 
an enriched what is said, or what is asserted (as benefiting from pragmatic 
contribution) outside of semantics’ scope. I also agree with his idea that lan-
guage-users have intuitions of characters*, and are consciously aware of how 
characters* are saturated and freely enriched.8 What I disagree with is (i) his 
claim that this is in tension with Recanati’s phenomenological availability con-
straint (since Recanati could argue for a local availability by which language-
users are consciously aware of the move from the linguistic meaning of some 
words to their modulated meanings) but I’m not concerned with this issue here; 
and (ii) his explanation of such intuitions in terms of rational reconstruction. 
8 This claim has been advanced by Carston (2007) as an objection to Recanati’s account 
of primary processes (corresponding to the utterance’s truth-conditional content) as being non-
inferential and insensitive to speaker’s intentions. E.g. in cases in which the supplementation 
of the intended referent is sensitive to speaker’s intentions.
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To understand the sense in which Carpintero claims his characters* to be 
psychologically real, we’d have to make a long detour through Peacocke’s (1986: 
101) conception of 1,5 level of explanation (which states the information on 
which, in his terms,  “the algorithm draws”).9 For simplicity, here’s how Carpin-
tero (2007a: 50) adverts to Peacoke’s concept as giving the explanatory force 
of a semantic theory:
“The proponent of a view about the semantics-pragmatics divide such as the 
one I am advancing says that characters* are psychologically real in that sense 
[cf. Peacocke]. In particular, the subpersonal mechanisms responsible for the 
production and interpretation of intelligible speech acts should “draw upon” the 
information that the semantic theory packages into the relevant characters*[…]. 
This is compatible with Recanati’s views on primary pragmatic processes: the 
actual processes involved in giving rise, in real time, to what he counts as what 
is said can be characterized as inferences, but they are merely inferences at the 
subpersonal level, in which “what is literally expressed” (the character*, on the 
present view) plays no role as a premise in a conscious inference. The present 
point is that the same applies to secondary processes in actual cases.”10
Be that as it may, I have my reservations as to how Carpintero’s character*-
semantics is psychological real, in that the characters*’ psychological reality in 
virtue of our conscious intuitions of the subpersonal inferences from characters* 
to saturated and freely enriched contents is not warranted in the psychologically 
relevant sense, i.e. having intuitions of such inferences as they occur in the 
actual process of interpretation, rather than supporting rational reconstructions. 
Although I sympathize with Carpintero’s divide of semantics-pragmatics, I 
remain discontented with his explanation of linguistic understanding in terms 
of rational reconstruction.
The motivation for a rational reconstruction in the face of the challenge 
from psychological evidence is forcefully defended by neo-Griceans like Bach 
(2001)11 and Soames (2008). Soames’ explanation of the comprehension process 
consists in offering an idealized model of conversation where an ideally rational 
9 Related to language understanding, Peacocke (1986: 113) argues that the informational 
content of the language-users subpersonal states at level 1,5 “is sufficient to determine the 
meaning of all the sentences they understand.”
10 I am a bit unclear whether the assessment of Recanati’s primary processes as being 
underpinned by inferences, be they subpersonal, is Carpintero’s interpretation of how Reca-
nati’s primary processes should be conceived of, since on Recanati’s view, they are merely as-
sociative. I feel the need of an explanation as to how such inferences are derived without relying 
on a premise of “what is literally expressed” (this was precisely the reason why Recanati rejects 
an inferential account of primary processes). But that’s of no importance here.
11 In response to the psychological objections, Bach (2001: 24; 2006: 67) distinguishes 
between the character of the information available to the hearer in the process of identifying 
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agent would correctly interpret an utterance if the judgments at which he arrives 
about what was asserted and implicated matched those of competent speakers 
who associate semantic content with the sentence, and explicitly employ Gricean 
and other pragmatic rules. The difference between an idealized model and 
whatever is really at work psychologically involves the model’s use of semantic 
content as input to interpreting utterances, but this is not a feature of our cogni-
tive architecture. Soames rightly contends, I think, that our linguistic compe-
tence doesn’t require having “psychologically robust representations which carry 
all and only the information semantically encoded by our sentences.” What is 
important is that speakers/hearers have substantial uniformity regarding the 
salient information extracted from utterances in various contexts, namely that 
conclusions about what has been asserted and implied are inferred using this 
information. The model is validated if these conclusions match those of real 
speakers in real speech-situations, and the success of the reconstruction would 
be evidence that the semantic and pragmatic theories it contained were correct. 
Therefore, by offering a rational idealization that could track the psychologically 
real processes of ordinary speakers, neo-Griceans hope to invest in a theoreti-
cal adequacy claim without addressing directly the challenge from empirical 
evidence. 
I argue, against their skepticism, that hypotheses about the psychologically 
real processes involved in determining the truth-conditional content and impli-
catures of utterances are not only necessary in accounting for specific cases of 
language-use (IV), but they can be naturally construed within a TCP paradigm 
like that endorsed by relevance-theorists (RT).
III. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics 
RT’s lexical-pragmatics is a species of truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP), 
i.e. the doctrine that pragmatic processes that are “free” (not linguistically 
driven) play a crucial role in determining the truth-conditions of an utterance. 
TCP holds that an utterance’s truth-conditions are not wholly encoded in the 
sentence uttered (even allowing for the reference assignment and disambiguation 
Grice acknowledges); rather, a contextual adjustment is needed. TCP claims 
that there is a gap between (a) the content generated by the linguistic meaning 
of a sentence when values are assigned to indexicals or free variables occurring 
within it, and (b) the utterance’s truth-conditions. It holds that the linguistic 
speaker meaning (including the truth-conditions), and how this information is exploited in on-
line processing.
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meanings encoded by sentences are highly schematic: they fall very far short 
of determining the truth-conditional content, and many “free” pragmatic proc-
esses are needed to uncover this content. In contrast to Borg’s minimal seman-
tics, the semantics approved by relevance-theorists, but also by other species of 
TCP (Recanati 2004, Bach 2006), need not deliver anything fully propositional; 
the output of linguistic processing falls well short of answering to ordinary 
speaker-hearer intuitions about the truth-conditional content of utterances.
 The TCP embraced by relevance-theorists conceives of speaker mean-
ing as being composed of the truth-conditional content (explicature) and 
implicature(s). Moreover, it posits precise constraints on the derivation of the 
truth-conditional content: (i) it is a pragmatic development of the encoded lin-
guistic meaning, and (ii) it must provide inferential warrant for the implicature. 
The device that regulates these constraints is a mechanism of mutual adjustment 
from which it follows that a hypothesis about an implicature can both precede 
and shape a hypothesis about the truth-conditional content. Specifically, the 
hearer’s hypotheses about implicatures, formed on the basis of his expectation 
of relevance in a conversational situation, can influence the development of the 
logical form into truth-conditional content, and his retrieval/construction of 
contextual assumptions. Hence, in function of what he takes the speaker as 
having implied, he might be able to reason a way to a decision about what she 
might have said/asserted. Thus, assumptions about the truth-conditional content 
and assumptions about implicatures are derived in parallel and mutually adjusted 
to each other until they stabilize in a logical argument with determinate contents: 
implicatures are logically grounded in the truth-conditional content together 
with relevant contextual assumptions. This process can involve several (re)ad-
justments to each of the various kinds of assumptions involved, with hypoth-
eses about any one or combination of truth-conditional content, implicature, 
and contextual assumptions affecting hypotheses about any of the others. 
Such a process is predicted to be inferential through and through. Whereas 
the implicature is warranted by following logically from the truth-conditional 
content and contextual assumptions, the two latter receive their inferential war-
rant in different ways. In virtue of the mutual adjustment, they can be confirmed 
by ‘backwards’ inference: if the conclusion—implicature—seems a promising 
hypothesis about the speaker meaning (answering the hearer’s question), and 
the entire interpretation is consistent with the expectations of relevance raised 
by the utterance, then the hearer has good reason to adjust the premises so that 
they warrant that conclusion. Hence, the contextual assumptions get their in-
ferential warrant entirely from backwards confirmation, i.e. by fitting into a 
valid argument together with other assumptions that are in play. On the other 
hand, the truth-conditional content is inferentially warranted both from the 
linguistic meanings of constituents, and from backwards confirmation by fitting 
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into an argument where together with contextual assumptions it justifies the 
implicature. Specifically, the relation between the literal meanings of words 
and their semantic value is explained via local pragmatic processes of adjusting 
(e.g. narrowing, broadening) word meanings into modulated meanings such that 
they feed directly onto the utterance’s truth-conditional content. This process 
of ‘free’ pragmatic modulation involves backwards inferences: when a contex-
tual implication is derived, the hearer treats it as a potential implicature of the 
utterance, which may in turn help adjust some word’s meaning into a modulated 
meaning, thus shaping the truth-conditional content which then can warrant the 
expected implicature. 
Hence, on this view, what speakers say (as part of what they want to com-
municate directly and explicitly) by uttering a sentence in a context incorporates 
the pragmatically adjusted meanings, which are not merely indirectly or im-
plicitly conveyed, as they are for Griceans/neo-Griceans. This is the case with 
loose talk, metaphorical, metonymical and even hyperbolic utterances. Whereas 
Griceans/neo-Griceans treat such cases as instances where the hearer under-
stands the speaker to have explicitly said one thing but to have meant something 
else instead, relevance-theorists and philosophers defending TCP propose an 
explanation according to which the contextual meanings of words communicated 
in such cases are pragmatic developments of semantically encoded meanings. 
Importantly, those local pragmatic processes that determine the relevant con-
textual meanings are not, however, entirely unconstrained, as critics have pointed 
out. They are, in effect, enriched or loosened on the basis of the conventional 
meanings of words, and are tailored in such a way so as to fit the expectations 
of relevance set by the utterance in the context in which it is uttered. The upshot 
is a level of content that accords with speakers/hearers intuitions of what has 
been said, and what makes the utterance true. Hence, an adequate theoretical 
notion of ‘what is said’ is one that is grounded in pragmatic considerations about 
what speakers do in making their utterances, specifically what mental states 
they want to be taken as defending.
IV. Ironic Metaphor
I argue that one of the reasons why rational reconstruction is unsatisfactory 
is that interpretation of ironic metaphor (IM), as in (1)-(3), gives the wrong pre-
dictions when allowing a different order of interpretation—irony first and then 
metaphor—which is predicted from a rational reconstruction perspective. 
(1) Mary is the Taj Mahal.
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(2) He is a towering figure.
(3) What a delicate lace work!
To explain why only a metaphor-first approach gives the right result, I argue 
for a psychological and logical metaphor’s priority thesis (MPT), i.e. in cases 
of IM, the metaphor is/has to be computed before the irony. Grice (1989: 34) 
is the first to advocate logical MPT, when he claims that when interpreting a 
metaphor like “You are the cream in my coffee,” the hearer has to reach first 
the metaphor ‘You are my pride and joy’ and then calculate an ironic interpre-
tation ‘You are my bane’ on the basis of metaphor. Unfortunately, however, he 
does not give an argument for this claim, nor how the passage from meta-
phorical to ironical meaning is negotiated. We aim to remedy this omission. 
My strategy involves distinguishing weak from strong versions of both psycho-
logical and logical MPT, resulting in four versions of MPT.
Weak MPT: in some cases of IM, the metaphor is/has to be computed 
first. 
Strong MPT: in all cases of IM, the metaphor is/has to be computed 
first.
In order of increasing strength they are: weak psychological MPT, weak 
logical MPT, strong psychological MPT, and strong logical MPT. I argue for 
each in turn.
The argument for weak psychological MPT is as follows. It is widely agreed 
that irony operates globally on propositional contents to determine new contents. 
But at least sometimes, metaphor operates locally on expressions (before the 
whole utterance is computed). Since local operations work prior to global op-
erations, this supports psychological MPT in those cases in which the metaphoric 
interpretation is local, the irony swinging into play only after all interpretations 
involving words have been calculated.
The argument for weak logical MPT relies on a reasoning-by-absurdum 
which aims at showing that an irony-first approach is conceptually difficult or 
impossible. Consider the case in which (3) is used concerning a doctor’s inde-
cipherable scrawl. If irony has priority over metaphor, it seems difficult to pin 
down an appropriate contrary to the literal term, which then interpreted meta-
phorically yields the intended interpretation. Following Stern (2000: 236), I 
argue that there is no rational route to the literal term’s opposite, without priory 
retrieving the metaphor. Now suppose that from a rational reconstruction view-
point, an irony-first order of interpretation is available for (3). This can be 
represented in two-stages: a simple irony generally represented by means of a 
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negation operator as in (3’a), which then requires replacing the literal meaning 
of ‘lacework’ with a metaphorical one as in (3’b).
(3’)  a. That’s NOT lacework.  
b. That’s NOT beautiful/crafted (handwriting).
However, the irony-first interpretation seems to miss its target: it may not 
apply to the intended referent (doctor’s handwriting), as when we wrongly un-
derstand (3) to comment on some expensive curtains the cat just ripped to shreds. 
If such a situation is salient in context, then there is no need for a metaphoric 
reinterpretation; the interpretation stops at the first-stage with a simple irony, 
and the ironic metaphor is lost. 
The problem seems to be rather a matter of scope: if irony is construed as 
an operator of negation taking in its scope only the literal meaning of the ex-
pression, then the result cannot be the intended irony, as part of an IM under-
standing. Some might argue that it is in the nature of rational reconstruction to 
take the irony-first interpretation further, replacing the literal meaning within 
the scope of negation with a metaphorical meaning. However, if one is to un-
derstand the irony in relation to the doctor’s handwriting, it is essential to have 
already computed the metaphor, since it is this that gives him access to the 
intended referent. Since referents have to be established for determining the 
utterance’s truth-conditional content, and since irony builds on such content, 
then weak logical MPT follows straightforwardly.
The difficulty of an irony-first approach is even more patent in (1), where 
the irony necessarily builds on the metaphor: since what is literally said involves 
a category mistake which makes it difficult to maintain a plausible literal in-
terpretation, one could hardly avoid a metaphoric interpretation. But then the 
irony-first reversing the literal meaning of the utterance is pointless, because it 
merely yields a banal literal truth ‘Mary is NOT the Taj Mahal.’ I therefore 
conclude that it is difficult to retrieve the intended irony, unless metaphor is 
already computed. A similar argument is given by Bezuidenhout (2001) who 
shows that metaphors launched from irony are difficult, if not impossible. The 
conclusion she draws is that when other interpretations are present, metaphor 
must precede them. Consequently, cases of “once-removed metaphors” (i.e. 
metaphors launched from irony or cases of indirection like indirect requests) 
are simply difficult, if not impossible. I agree with her conclusion, but I go even 
further in putting this constraint on the account of the difference between 
metaphor and irony. While irony takes scope on some propositional content, 
reversing the literal meaning of the sentence uttered, metaphor takes a sub-
sentential scope, pragmatically adjusting the literal meaning of an expression. 
This suggests that the scope operated by metaphor ought to have been effected 
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before the irony takes scope on the whole sentence, leading therefore to an order 
of interpretation of the form IronyMetaphor  <P> rather than 
MetaphorIrony<P>. 
To buttress the argument, think of an analogous argument concerning the 
ironic use of idioms. For instance, a quasi-metaphorical idiom ‘don’t give up 
the ship’ used to communicate that one should persevere in the face of adversity, 
when it is used in the context of someone giving up, it functions ironically, but 
only if it is first understood as metaphor for perseverance. Similarly, the idiom 
‘burying the hatchet’ refers to declaring an end to hostilities, or peace, but when 
it is used in the context of someone NOT making peace, it will function ironi-
cally. Other examples of this sort are ‘locking the barn door after the cows have 
fled,’ ‘striking gold,’ ‘it’s a gold mine,’ etc.
One way of tackling the strong logical MPT, i.e. in all cases of ironic 
metaphor, the metaphor has to be computed first, is to admit that irony and 
metaphor require different mechanisms of interpretation; if they were similar 
in nature, we would expect more freedom, and hence inversion, in the order of 
interpretation. A first characterization of this difference comes from relevance 
theorists for whom metaphors are used descriptively to represent a possible/
actual state of affairs, while ironies are used interpretively to (meta)represent 
another representation (a possible/actual utterance/thought) that it resembles in 
content. A more convincing reason for strong logical MPT is, perhaps, the 
necessity of distinguishing an extra-level of meaning beyond the speaker’s 
meaning qua content, which is imposed by the order of processing of the two 
figurative meanings.
The argument for strong logical MPT relies on a first claim that the correct 
standard interpretation of an IM, such as (2) is closer to that of
the associated simple irony
Utterance He is important
Ironical meaning He is not important
than it is to that of
the associated simple (negated) metaphor
Utterance He is not a towering figure
Metaphorical meaning He is not important
Although the content is the same in both cases, the associated irony captures 
the speaker’s attitude of contempt towards his colleague who thinks he’s 
achieved some important discovery (whereas nobody shares that opinion), which 
is lost with the associated negated metaphor. Despite metaphor’s richness, the 
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speaker’s attitude is not part of the metaphorical content; the speaker is merely 
interested in pointing out some similarity, or with the negated metaphor that 
there is no such similarity. That IM is closer to irony than to metaphor leads to 
a further claim that this fact is correctly predicted by strong logical MPT, on 
which the order of interpretation is
Metaphor-first proposal
Utterance He is a towering figure
Metaphor: He is important
Irony: He is not important
but is not correctly predicted by, the irony-first approach, on which the 
order of interpretation is
Irony-first proposal 
Utterance He is a towering figure
Irony: He is not a towering figure (He is short/diminutive)
Metaphor: He is not important
Although an irony-first proposal seems prima facie plausible from a rational 
reconstruction viewpoint, on which irony, even if not relevant, is remedied by 
metaphoric reinterpretation, this strategy fails to deliver the intended interpre-
tation. Even though the two approaches—metaphor-first and irony-first—deliver 
the same content, there is something more than speaker meaning qua content 
that accounts for their difference. This is related to the order of processing of 
the two figurative meanings. If the hearer goes with irony-first, there is no way 
to capture the speaker’s attitude, as this concerns in fact the colleague’s inflated 
opinion of his important career, as delivered by the metaphoric interpretation, 
rather than the literal one concerning his height. It seems that the intended 
interpretation of IM goes beyond speaker meaning qua content; it has to factor 
in the route by which the two figurative meanings are reached at. Therefore, it 
is the metaphor-first approach that correctly predicts the target of the ironical 
attitude, namely a metaphoric claim that is merely pretended or echoed, thus 
supporting strong logical MPT.
The argument for strong psychological MPT consists in looking at hypoth-
eses about the metarepresentational inferences involved in understanding IMs. 
A first hypothesis is that the metarepresentational inferences required in IMs 
are reduced as compared to those required for understanding simple ironies. 
Colston & Gibbs (2002) explain this hypothesis by metaphor’s capacity for 
muting the ironical meaning, thus attenuating the speaker’s critical attitude 
characteristic of irony. However, it is unclear how the metarepresentational 
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inferences are reduced in processing IMs, unless metaphor is treated as express-
ing its content directly, without going through a metarepresentational premise 
of the form ‘The speaker believes that (P).’ Yet, two further hypotheses are 
available. 
H1: understanding IM enhances the degree of metarepresentational infer-
ences as compared to processing irony alone. The metaphorical formulation of 
another’s thought, or another’s metaphorical thought which the speaker is 
echoing in IM is expected to increase the inferential steps: {The speaker believes 
that [X believes that (X believes that ((P))]}. This possibility is in tension with 
the claim that metaphor is processed as part of what is said, since the utterance 
should be first interpreted literally, then metaphorically, and then ironically. 
This possibility is dismissed, though, given the low ratings for understanding 
metaphors. 
H2: understanding IM requires the same amount of metarepresentational 
inferences as processing simple ironies. Adding a metaphor to a speaker’s ironic 
utterance should not complicate the metarepresentations the hearer has to infer; 
there should be no consequential difference between echoing a metaphorical 
thought or formulating metaphorically another’s thought with IM, and echoing 
a literal thought with simple irony, since both thoughts are expressed directly. 
The fact that the hearer has to think about the speaker’s thoughts about an-
other’s thoughts to understand irony, or about her thoughts about another’s 
metaphorical thoughts to understand IM should not increase the range of second-
order inferences. This shows, I think, that the metaphorical formulation of 
another’s thought or someone else’s metaphorical thought that the speaker is 
echoing in IM has the same contribution as any other literal thought: both 
contribute to the utterance’s truth-conditional content. Furthermore, since it is 
another’s metaphorical thought that is ironized, then metaphor is clearly part 
of the metarepresentation that needs to be computed for understanding the irony, 
as part of IM, thus supporting strong psychological MPT. 
Having argued that in IM, the metaphor is processed first, I argue that in 
such cases, metaphor is processed directly, i.e. as part of the utterance’s truth-
conditional content. I consider semantic arguments about the behavior of IM 
with respect to the embeddability criterion and its import to truth-conditions. 
Since metaphor is embeddable, but irony is not, it follows that IM is not embed-
dable in the scope of logical operators like the negation in  (4a), or the anteced-
ent of a conditional in (4b), or in the scope of a propositional attitude operator 
in (4c) without losing the irony.
(4)  a. Mary is not the Taj Mahal, she’s the Empire State building. 
b. If Mary is the Taj Mahal, then I’d love to have her as model. 
c. Steve believes that Mary is the Taj Mahal. 
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That IM is not embeddable in (4a-c) shows that irony takes scope over 
metaphor, suggesting that the metaphor is part of the utterance’s truth-condi-
tional content. A similar argument comes from responses to IMs, pertaining to 
the utterance’s truth-conditions, as in (5a-b).
(5)  a.? Sure she is. That’s why I don’t want to go out with her. 
b.? That’s not true. She has a certain charm and is quite a sophisti-
cated lady.
The reason why (5a-b) are failed attempts to respond to an IM is that while 
the speaker is willing to stick to the metaphorical meaning as being what she 
said/asserted, she cannot do that with the ironical meaning which is merely 
suggested. Even if the hearer picks a different metaphorical meaning than what 
the speaker had in mind she can reply by negative and switch to a different 
metaphorical reading. The consequence is that, if metaphor is truth-conditional 
and IM is not, and truth-conditions have to obtain before any implicature is 
generated from the saying of what is said, then metaphor has to be processed 
first as part of the utterance’s truth-conditional content, and irony is processed 
afterwards as being grounded into the metaphorical content. 
This result is not, arguably, what is predicted from the rational reconstruc-
tion adopted by neo-Gricean accounts, like Borg’s or Carpintero’s. First, a 
minimalist like Borg couldn’t account for metaphorical meaning as being part 
of the utterance’s truth-conditions. Second, even if Carpintero might accom-
modate metaphorical meaning as part of his intermediate level of “what is as-
serted,” there remain concerns as to whether the metaphor-first order of 
interpretation can be predicted by his rational reconstruction. Even though this 
is not a crucial criticism of his theory, hopefully the data pertaining to IM in-
terpretation will suggest further answers to the controversial matter of how to 
draw the borderline between semantics and pragmatics.
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